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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
appeal offers a uniform and expeditious 47 vehicle for consideration of
orders deemed "too important to be denied review" 48 by an impressive
number of circuit courts of appeals.4 9
Silver Chrysler represents an example of the Second Circuit's
willingness to apply Cohen in a proper setting. The court's decision,
however, is predicated on the substantial effect the denial of disquali-
fication of counsel may have on the litigation. Thus, the case offers no
indication that the Second Circuit is prepared to depart from its gen-
erally restrictive treatment of the collateral order rule. 0
Edgar J. Royce
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF CLASS ACTION DESIGNATION
Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.
Interlocutory appeals are not viewed favorably by most courts.'
Fearing that piecemeal appeals would result in a waste of judicial en-
ergy, Congress early established the final judgment rule2 and has con-
district court was requested to certify an appeal. Each of these attempts to perfect an
appeal, with the exception of the notice of appeal, "included the same repetitious state-
ments of, fact and law and each required time-consuming considerations by the courts."
496 F.2d at 802. On balance, the disposition of these matters could result in a greater
waste of time and expense than would result if the arguably appealable order were
directly reviewed.
47 The interest in conservation and careful allocation of judicial resources underlying
the final judgment rule can, in some cases, militate in favor of permitting a direct appeal
As the Silver Chrysler court noted:
By holding such an order [denying disqualification] directly appealable, we elmi-
nate the uncertainties (and the paperwork) attendant to resorting to § 1292(b)
and]or § 1651. Since the ultimate objective is to bring before an appellate court
an important question which, if unresolved, might well taint a trial, why should
not this question be presented before judicial and attorney time may have been
needlessly expended?
496 F.2d at 806.
48 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
49 See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
50 See, e.g., Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972);
West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1970); Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935,
937 (2d Cir. 1968). See also I.B.M. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed sub noma., I.B.M. Corp. v. Edelstein, 42 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S.
June 11, 1973).
Since the decision in Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed its position
on the appealability of disqualification orders. General Motors Corp. v. City of N.Y., 501
F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974).
1 Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 340 (1963); Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945).
2 The concept of finality can be traced to the first Judiciary Act. Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85. Congress has forbidden piecemeal appeals
from a single controversy in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. The under-
lying rationale is that appeals of interlocutory orders cause an unjustifiable and intoler-
able delay since such orders merge into the final judgment and will be ultimately
[Vol. 49:323
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tinued to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in most instances
to "final decisions" of the district courts.8 Nevertheless, in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 1),4 the Second Circuit permitted the plain-
tiff to appeal from an order denying his lawsuit class action status be-
cause the denial would, in effect, terminate the action. Despite the
unpopularity of its decision in Eisen 1,1 the Second Circuit subsequently
announced by way of dictum in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen
reviewable. The Supreme Court has noted that the time and money consumed by ap-
peals make them attractive as harassment measures, thereby obstructing valid claims.
See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
8 The finality rule is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), which provides in pertinent
part:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court.
Congress has provided a limited number of statutory exceptions to the requirements of
finality. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (immediate review available for interlocutory or-
ders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions ... ."). See also
note 45 infra. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme
Court further excepted from the finality requirement those orders that determine claims
collateral to and independent of the main cause of action and which are too important
to be denied review. See generally Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory
Orders-A Structural Reform Toward Redefinition, 7 SuFroLK L. REV. 1037 (1973).
4370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). In Eisen I, the Second
Circuit enunciated its celebrated "death knell" rule which permits a plaintiff who has
been denied class action status to appeal if the district court's order would "for all prac-
tical purposes terminate the litigation." Id. at 121. Since Eisen's personal claim was for
a mere $70, it was safe to conclude that the plaintiff would abandon the lawsuit. Subse-
quent to Esen I, the Second Circuit has allowed appellate review where the would-be
class representative's claim was as high as $1042. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). See also Kom v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (appeal sustained where individual claim was for $386). Where the
individual's claim is considerably more substantial, review has been denied. See, e.g.,
Shayne v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 491 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974) (appeal dismissed
where the individual claim was for $7482); Cacers v. International Air Transp. Ass'n,
422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970) (appeal dismissed where average claim was for $150,000).
5 See King v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff
sought to represent all former shareholders of specific mutual funds); Songy v. Coastal
Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent
defendant's air and noise pollution); Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374
(10th Cir. 1972) (suit challenging "no-marriage" rule for airline stewardesses); Hackett v.
General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (consumer
antitrust suit against bread distributors); Lamarche v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 446
F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1971) (motions to proceed in forma pauperis and to maintain suit as
class action denied).
A number of cases in which appeal has been denied can be reconciled with Eisen I,
since the plaintiffs' claims were suffidenty substantial to suggest that the lawsuits would
have continued without class action status. See Grad v. United States, 472 F.2d 124 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (plaintiff's claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act was for $78,000); Falk v. Dempsey Tegeler & Co., 472 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1972) (plain-
tiff sought $14,125 in a suit alleging securities fraud); Gosa v. Securities Inv. Co., 449
F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1971) (appeal dismissed where the suit was for $3,322.20 and denial
would not terminate the action); Weingartner v. Union Oil Co., 431 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971) (plaintiffs' claim in private antitrust suit was for
$353,700).
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111),6 that the same reasoning for allowing a plaintiff to appeal from a
denial of class action status would mandate that a defendant be per-
mitted to appeal where class action status has been granted7 The court
in Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.8 seized upon
the guidelines suggested in Eisen III and allowed the defendant to ap-
peal a district court order authorizing the plaintiff to proceed as repre-
sentative of a class.9
Herbst had its genesis in the 1970 merger of International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) and Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
Mrs. Herbst, a Hartford stockholder, alleged that irregularities in
ITT's handling of the proposed stock transfer jeopardized a favorable
tax ruling previously received from the Internal Revenue Service.10
She contended that if all the circumstances had been revealed to the
stockholders, ITT would have been required to increase its offer for.
Hartford stock. Basing her action on various antifraud provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 she sought either rescission or
6479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
71d. at 1007 n.1. In Eisen III, the court of appeals exercised jurisdiction which it
purportedly retained following its decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). In Eisen II, the district court had been directed to conduct fur-
ther hearings as to whether the action was maintainable as a class action. Upon remand,
the district court found that a class action was proper, 52 F.R.D. 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
and later ordered the defendants to pay 90% of the cost of notifying the class members,
54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Defendants appealed, relying upon the Second Circuit's
retention of jurisdiction and the finality provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). The court of
appeals held the action was not maintainable as a class action and dismissed the suit. 479
F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1973). The jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review the inter-
locutory order was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court on the ground that the
district court's order imposing the cost of notice on the defendants was an appealable
"final decision" under § 1291. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974).
However, the Supreme Court did not address itself to the issue of whether the defen-
dants had a right to appeal from the district court's grant of class action status.
8 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
9 judge Lumbard authored the opinion of the court. judge Mulligan concurred, but
with "grave doubt." Id. at 1325. judge Danaher, of the District of Columbia Circuit,
sitting by designation, concurred dubitante.
loIn 1969 ITT purchased approximately 1.7 million shares (about 8%) of the Hart-
ford common stock and later entered into a proposed merger agreement. ITT sought a
ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that the merger would be a tax-free
reorganization. As a condition for a favorable ruling, ITT was to dispose of the Hartford
stock it had previously acquired. Herbst claimed that in an agreement entered into be-
tween ITT and Mediobanca BancadiCredito Finanziore-S.P.A. (Mediobanca), ITT did not
properly divest itself of the Hartford holdings-that Mediobanca was merely holding
the stock for a fee. The merger plans in 1969 did not materialize, however, because of the
disapproval of the Insurance Commissioner of Connecticut. ITT modified the terms of
its offer, and the Insurance Commissioner's approval was obtained. Since the tax con-
sequences of the later plan were identical to those of the previous attempted merger, no
supplemental IRS ruling was sought for either the proposed merger or the arrangement
with Mediobanca. Id. at 1310-11. The initially favorable tax ruling was revoked by
the IRS after the appellate arguments were heard in the case. Id. at 1310 n.2.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970). The Second Circuit did not delineate all the statu-
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the difference between ITT's offer and what it might have been re-
quired to offer. Mrs. Herbst then petitioned the court for permission
to represent, as a class, all Hartford stockholders pursuant to rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12 It was the district court's con-
sent that precipitated ITT's appeal.13
Although the Herbst opinion expressly adopts a three-part test
proposed in Eisen III, it does not reveal how these requirements were
satisfied by the facts before the court. Thus, it can only be presumed
that the test was fulfilled. The first inquiry set forth in Eisen III is
whether the granting of class action status is "fundamental to the fur-
ther conduct of the case."'1 Since Mrs. Herbst held only 100 of the 22
million shares of Hartford common stock exchanged in the merger with
ITT,5 it is likely that a denial of class action status would have sounded
the "death knell" of the action. 16 The second Eisen III requirement,
presumably satisfied in Herbst, is the separability of questions of notice
and manageability from the plaintiff's substantive claims. 7 The third
element of the Eisen III test is the possibility that in defending the
class action irreparable injury might befall the defendant.' 8 In this
tory provisions relied upon by Mrs. Herbst in her complaint, but at least one of the
grounds was that ITT had violated section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and rule lOb-5,
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See 495
F.2d at 1310, 1313.
12FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1) requires the court to determine the feasibility of class ac-
tion status as soon as possible after the initiation of the action. However, the determina-
tion is merely conditional, and it may be amended before a decision on the merits.
13 The defendant's appeal was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), which gives the
courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of the district courts.
14479 F.2d 1005, 1007 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973).
15 495 F.2d at 1310.
16 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 1), 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
17 479 F.2d at 1007 n.1. The requirement of separability from the merits stems from
the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),
where the Court stated:
We hold this [interlocutory] order appealable because it is a final disposition of
a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not
require consideration with it.
Id. at 546-47.
18479 F.2d at 1007 n.1. In Eisen II, Judge Medina commented:
mhe preliminary procedures, including ... the huge and unavoidable expense
of producing witnesses and documents pursuant to discovery orders have brought
such pressure on defendants as to induce settlements in large amounts as the al-
ternative to complete ruin and disaster, irrespective of the merits of the claim.
Id. at 1019.
The great power of the plaintiff class has been criticized in Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. R1y. 1 (1971).
Professor Handier contends that if innocent defendants have no real alternative except
settlement, it is a defacto deprivation of the constitutional right of a trial on the merits.
Arguing that settlements remove the distinction between the innocent defendants and
those whose actions have caused great hardship, he asserts that the size of the ransom
paid for peace becomes the primary issue. He emphasizes that
1975]
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regard, the Herbst opinion notes, generally, that enormous expendi-
tures are incurred in defending massive class actions, and that, since
potential damages often reach millions of dollars, defendants are in-
clined to settle, even where the claims are spurious. 19 Having resolved
the jurisdictional issue in defendant's favor, it was concluded, however,
that the district court did not err in authorizing a class action.20
In two subsequent decisions, Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells21 and
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,22 the Second Circuit indi-
cated that it did not view Herbst as signalling a policy of unqualified
appealability of orders granting class action status. Chief Judge Kauf-
man, writing for the panels in both cases, applied the Herbst tripartite
analysis to preclude interlocutory appeal. In Kohn, the plaintiff, a female
law student, claimed that the law firm of Royall, Koegel & Wells dis-
criminated against women in its hiring proceduresus Challenging the
firm's employment practices and internal promotion procedures, Ms.
Kohn sought both damages and injunctive relief to correct past dis-
criminatory practices. 24 She subsequently moved to represent all women
qualified for legal positions at Royall, Koegel & Wells, and upon the
granting of the motion the defendant appealed. In General Motors, the
City charged General Motors with antitrust violations in the alleged
monopolization of the nationwide bus market. Immediately after the
suit was initiated, the City successfully moved to represent similarly
situated municipalities, an estimated 177 cities.25 Here too, defendant
immediately appealed the class action designation. 26
[a]ny device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanage-
able and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it
is a form of legalized blackmail.
Id. at 9.
19495 F.2d at 1312-13.
201d. at 1316.
21496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
22 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
23 It was alleged that defendant had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972). Kohn was interviewed at Columbia Uni-
versity for a summer position with Royall, Koegel & Wells. When an offer of employment
was not forthcoming, she filed a complaint with the New York City Commission on
Human Rights. Six months later, a similar complaint was filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She subsequently received permission to sue the
law firm from EEOC. 496 F.2d at 109.
A discussion of the problems facing the parties in civil rights class actions is found
in Comment, Class Actions & Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class
Representative and the Class Remedy, 47 TUL. L. RExv. 1005 (1973).
24The court did not reach the question of the plaintiff's standing to challenge in-
ternal employment practices because such inquiry would touch on the ultimate merits of
Kohn's claim. 496 F.2d at 1100.
25 City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The
City originally sought to represent between 200 and 300 municipalities and ultimately
submitted a list of 177 to Judge Carter.
26A corollary question that was raised on appeal dealt with disqualification of the
[Vol. 49:323
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In both Kohn and General Motors, the initial inquiry, whether the
class status was "fundamental" to the continuation of the action, was
answered negatively. It was found that Kohn could reasonably be
expected to continue the action without the class designation.27 The
same was true of the City in light of its 12 million dollar claim.28
Hence, a denial of the motion in both instances would not have ter-
minated the action. Unlike the situation in Herbst, the defendants
would probably have been compelled to stand and defend whether or
not class action status was found improper.
Although the failure to comply with the threshold requirement
was dispositive of the appeal, the Kohn and General Motors panels,
nevertheless, inquired into the other two tests. In examining the ar-
guments raised by Royall, Koegel & Wells, the court concluded that
they were interwoven with the merits of Kohn's discrimination charge.29
This would necessitate resolving portions of the merits on the inter-
locutory appeal before the district court had an opportunity to rule
on them. A similar conclusion was reached in General Motors where
the defendant contended that proof relating to economic power, com-
petition, and behavior would vary for each class member.30 The court
construed this argument as an indication that these issues were critical
to the City's claim and, thus, would arise later at the trial.31 The third
Herbst test-that the class action designation result in irreparable harm
to the defendant--also failed in Kohn and General Motors. The Kohn
City's attorney. Twenty years prior to the City's suit, the United States had brought a
similar action against General Motors. One of the Government attorneys was now repre-
senting the City, and General Motors sought his disqualification because of a conflict of
interest. The Second Circuit agreed with the defendant:
Where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Govern-
ment employ so direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided
through disqualification.
501 F.2d at 652. See Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, 70 HAv. L. Rav. 657, 660 (1957).
The jurisdiction of the court of appeals to hear interlocutory appeals on the ques-
tion of attorney disqualification was decided by the Second Circuit in Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
27 The defendant conceded on oral argument that class action status was not "'fun-
damental to the further conduct of the case."' 496 F.2d at 1099. The court, in addition,
noted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits aggrieved plaintiffs to recover costs and
reasonable attorney's fees, thus virtually insuring the availability of cousel willing to
represent the plaintiff. 496 F.2d at 1100. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
28 501 F.2d at 645.
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) requires that, in order for a class action to be maintained,
there must be questions of law or fact common to the class. Id. (a)(4) requires that the
party seeking class action standing adequately represent the interests of the class. Royal,
Koegel & Wells argued that neither of these requirements was met. The court determined
that an examination of defendant's argument would necessitate an inquiry into Kohn's
standing to sue and the merits of her allegations. 496 F.2d at 1100.
30501 F.2d at 645.
81Id.
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court found that the increase in cost and time encountered in defending
the class action was insignificant in comparison with that in Herbst.32
In General Motors, it was determined that the alleged national monop-
oly would in any event lead to broad discovery proceedings, so the
defendant would not incur significantly higher costs if the lawsuit were
allowed to proceed as a class action.33 Neither the Kohn nor the General
Motors panel commented on the likelihood that the class action might
pressure the defendants to settle.
The Second Circuit's decision in Herbst to review the class action
designation is in direct conflict with the policies of at least two other
circuits. In Walsh v. City of Detroit,3 4 the Sixth Circuit dismissed an
interlocutory appeal from a grant of class action status. Emphasis was
placed on that portion of rule 23(c)(1) which gives the district court
power and authority to reconsider its class action determination, 5
thereby rendering such an order not final and, thus, unappealable. 36
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in Thill Securities Corp.
v. New York Stock Exchange.37 The plaintiff in Thill, a licensed secur-
ities broker, brought an antitrust action against the New York Stock
Exchange and successfully sought to represent all other securities dealers
not affiliated with the Exchange. 88 In dismissing defendant's appeal,
the Seventh Circuit indicated that the Exchange was unable to show a
compelling reason for an early appeal beyond the normal disadvantages
encountered by any litigant who must wait to appeal an adverse trial
ruling.8 9
32496 F.2d at 1100.
33501 F.2d at 646.
34 412 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969).
35 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) states, in relevant part: "An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
The Walsh court rejected the application of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), because in its opinion the "order was not collateral to and separable from the
rights asserted in the main action." 412 F.2d at 227.
36 412 F.2d at 227. To support its conclusion the court cited Kowalski v. Holden, 276
F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1960). In Holden, the Sixth Circuit ruled that interlocutory appeal of
a collateral issue would be unavailable unless substantial rights would be lost as a result
of delaying review until the litigation was terminated. 276 F.2d at 360. An analogy was
made between an order granting class action standing and one granting separate trials.
Both were considered nonappealable because they did not involve an extraordinary
situation.
37469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1972). The Thill court preferred to permit interlocutory ap-
peals only where irreparable harm would occur if the court waited until after a trial
on the merits. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S.
684 (1949).
38 469 F.2d at 17.
39 Id. On its facts, Thill would appear to be similar to Kohn and General Motors in
that the threshold test of Herbst was not satisfied. Thill, in an earlier phase of the
action, personally claimed actual damages of $7 million for which it sought the permitted
[V/ol. 49:323
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Substantial considerations support the Second Circuit's decision
in Herbst. In conclusively determining at the outset the propriety of a
class action designation, an interlocutory appeal may eliminate the
possibility of unnecessary expenditures by both parties. Defendants
will undoubtedly spend large sums in litigating class actions,40 and
plaintiffs must initially bear the cost of notice to "each class member
who can be identified through reasonable effort."4' Moreover, class
actions can generate untold managerial difficulties for the district court.
As pointed out in Herbst, rule 23(d) imposes broad supervisory re-
sponsibility upon the district court governing the conduct of the
action.42 Additionally, the immense proportions of a class action "nat-
urally take up infinitely more of the court's time than most other
civil actions." 43 Immediate review of the grant of class action status
may thus avoid the expenditure of much judicial time and energy,
which, ironically, is the raison d'etre of the finality concept.44 Until the
Herbst innovation, a district court might successfully resolve the
plethora of managerial complexities only to learn later that its efforts
were rendered worthless by an appellate court's decision that class
action status was improper.
Determining the appealability of an interlocutory order 5 requires
treble damages of $21 million. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d
264, 267 (7th Cir. 1970). Thus, it is likely that the plaintiff would have continued the
action despite the absence of class action designation.
40 See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
41 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)1
Where the plaintiff's personal stake in the suit is but a nominal amount, this requirement
can be devastating. In his dissent to the Second Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in
Eisen III, Judge Oakes calculated that the cost of mailing notices to the members of the
class would be $218,750. 479 F.2d at 1022 n.4.
42495 F.2d at 1313. Rule 23(d) authorizes the making of "appropriate orders" during
the progress of the litigation. Subdivision 2 outlines the procedural matters which may
prove the most troublesome to the court:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appro-
priate orders: . . (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such man-
ner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in tte
action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of mem-
bers to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to in-
tervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action ....
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(d)(2).
43495 F.2d at 1313.
44 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
45The "final decision" rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) is not, of course,
the only vehicle for an interlocutory appeal. For example, section 1292(a)(1) provides for
immediate review of interlocutory orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions .... Id. § 1292(a)(1). Section 1292(b) may also be utilized in certain
instances. Under § 1292(b), if the district judge believes that a nonappealable order under
§ 1291 or § 1292(a) involves a controlling question of law on which a substantial differ-
ence of opinion is likely and that an immediate appeal from this order would materially
1975]
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a delicate balancing approach." The difficulty which two appeals may
present must be weighed against the injuries that may arise when
interlocutory appeal is denied.47 The Herbst court was satisfied that
the potential savings of time and money by both litigants and federal
courts may militate in favor of interlocutory appeal where the reversal
of a class action designation could prove outcome-determinative of the
plaintiff's desire or ability to proceed. As applied in Kohn and General
Motors, the Herbst test proved to be an equally viable means of avoiding
"piecemeal" appeal where prosecution of the action appeared inev-
itable in any event.48 In view of the crucial role a denial or grant of
advance the suit, he may permit an interlocutory appeal which can be accepted in the
discretion of the court of appeals.
When it was first enacted there was some thought that courts might be too generous
in certifying interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b). See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAv.
L. REV. 356, 390 n.131 (1967). However, § 1292(b) has not been liberally applied. In Mil-
bert v. Bison Lab., 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1958), the court concluded that "the conditions
precedent to the granting by the court of permission to appeal which are laid down by
... section 1292(b) are to be strictly construed and applied." Id. at 435. See also Kraus v.
Board of County Road Comm'rs, 864 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1966); United States Rubber Co.
v. Wright, 859 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194
(2d Cir. 1959). This strict interpretation is based chiefly on the following passage taken
from H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958):
Your committee adopts with approval the view that appeals under this legislation
should only be used in exceptional cases where an immediate appeal may avoid
protracted and expensive litigation and is not to be used or granted in ordinary
litigation wherein the issues raised can otherwise be properly disposed of.
Id. at 1-2. See also S. REP. No. 2434, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). For a discussion of the
ramifications of § 1292(b) appeals, see Note Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking
Class Action Allegations, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 1292, 1296-97 (1970). See also Note Class
Action Certification Orders: An Argument for the Defendant's Right to Appeal, 42 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 621, 623-24 (1974).
In Johnson v. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth Circuit
granted appeal pursuant to a § 1292(b) certification in the case of an interlocutory order
denying class action designation. The Herbst panel, on the other hand, felt that appeal
of a grant of class action designation should be a matter of right, freeing the defendant
from relying upon the discretion of the district judge under § 1292(b). 495 F.2d at 1313 n.9.
46 As noted by Mr. Justice Powell in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974):
While the application of § 1291 in most cases is plain enough, determining the
finality of a particular judicial order may pose a close question. No verbal for-
mula yet devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or
provide an utterly reliable guide for the future.... The inquiry requires some
evaluation of the competing considerations underlying all questions of finality-
"the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger
of denying justice by the delay on the other."
Id. at 170-71, quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 US. 507, 511 (1950).
47 In 1965 the American Bar Association Special Committee on Federal Rules of
Procedure made the following observations:
It may be desirable for the Judicial Conference of the United States to review the
question of intermediate appeals generally. The current crowded appellate docket
is, in our opinion, no justification for unduly restricting intermediate appeals
where they may be useful in securing "the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation" of an action.
American Bar Association Special Committee on Federal Rules of Procedure, Report of
Aug. 1965, reprinted in 38 F.R.D. 95, 105 (1966).
48 As with all tests, there is always the danger that strict application will not prove
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class action standing can play in the outcome of a lawsuit, other circuits
should make use of the Herbst approach in determining whether an
interlocutory appeal of this issue is appropriate.
Thomas A. O'Rourke
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank
The issuance of federal injunctive relief against the enforcement
of allegedly unconstitutional state criminal statutes raises delicate ques-
tions of comity and federalism.1 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in
Younger v. Harris,2 established the basic principle that, absent extra-
ordinary circumstances,3 federal courts should not interfere with pend-
satisfactory in meeting changing circumstances. Judge Mansfield, concurring in General
Motors, aptly cautioned against inflexible utilization of the Herbst standard:
While the "three pronged" test ... sets forth relevant factors that should be
considered in deciding whether a class action certification is appealable, not all of
them strike me as mandatory conditions precedent to review. Moreover, I fear
that too strict or mechanical an adherence to the test, coupled with the engraft-
ing of excessively specific conditions on appealability, will lead to violation of
the Supreme Court's direction that § 1291 be given a "practical rather than a
technical construction."
501 F.2d at 656-57, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949).
1 Spears, The Supreme Court February Sextet: Younger v. Harris Revisited, 26 BAYLr
L. REv. 1 (1974). For an in depth analysis of developments in this area, see Note, Federal
Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers
and Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 965 (1973).
2 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The plaintiff was indicted for violation of the California Crim-
inal Syndicalism Act. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-01 (West 1970). He brought an action in
federal court to enjoin the prosecution, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional on its
face and that he would suffer irreparable harm. A three-judge court, holding that the law
was impermissibly vague and overbroad, enjoined further prosecution. Id. at 40. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's determination, holding that in order to enjoin
a pending state prosecution, the federal plaintiff must establish the existence of extra-
ordinary circumstances. Id. at 54. In this instance, the plaintiff would be required to prove
that his federally protected rights could not be vindicated by his defense in a single
prosecution. Id. at 46.
Decided the same day as Younger were five companion cases which both extend and
interpret the Court's holding. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (declaratory
relief denied for failure to meet Younger requirements); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81
(1971) (no threat of great and immediate injury); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84-85
(1971) (suppression of evidence would stifle good faith state prosecution); Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200, 203 (1971) (no irreparable injury); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 220
(1971) (failure to show that federal rights would not be adequately protected by defdnse
in state prosecution).
3 401 U.S. at 54. The most commonly cited extraordinary circumstances are bad faith
or harassment on the part of the state prosecutors. However, these are not exclusive, and
other unusual situations might develop which would mandate federal intervention.
In Dombrowsld v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court reversed the denial of injunc-
tive relief to a plaintiff being prosecuted pursuant to a statute which on its face violated
first amendment rights. Id. at 497. The Court emphasized the "chilling effects" that a
prosecution would have upon the exercise of such rights, regardless of the probable out-
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